The group considers the effects of fiscal institutions on budgeting outcomes. A central premise of the growing literature is that centralization of the budget process leads to better fiscal performance. This group evaluates the claim in a variety of settings, from different levels of government to different cultural environments. In links with the public management group, we also evaluate the effectiveness of different consolidation strategies that governments use. Finally, the group also considers explanations on the origins of institutions and strategies.

Projects
• Sovereign Debt Crises (Henrik Enderlein)
• The EU Budget (Henrik Enderlein)
• Fiscal Institutions in Latin America (Mark Hallerberg)
• Fiscal Federalism in the German Länder (Jobst Fiedler, Mark Hallerberg, Kai Wegrich)

Publications
• Iain Begg, Henrik Enderlein, Jacques Le Cacheux, and Mojmir Mrak: Financing of the EU Budget. Report for the European Commission, 2008.
• Jürgen von Hagen, Mark Hallerberg, and Rolf Strauch: Fiscal Governance: Evidence from Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
• Mark Hallerberg, Carlos Scartascini, and Ernesto Stein (eds.): Who Decides the Budget? A Political Economy Analysis of the Budget Process in Latin America, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.
• Mark Hallerberg and Guntram B. Wolff: "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy, and sovereign risk premia in EMU", in: Public Choice. 136. 3-4: 379-396, 2008.