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Transatlantic Relations: NATO and ESDP after Iraq
The role of the United States’ decision to invade Iraq in March 2003, without the support of NATO or the UN Security Council (UNSC), in triggering the current crisis within the North Atlantic community is disputed. While the history of NATO from the very beginning is fraught with crises,[1] from the crisis over German rearmament in the early 1950s, the crisis over the Suez-Canal debacle in 1956 and the various Balkans crises in the 1990s, it is argued by one camp that the current crisis is “symptomatic of the larger collapse of the European-U.S. cold war alliance community”;[2] the other camp, while stating that it is “probably the worst in the history of the Western alliance”[3] feel that there is reason for optimism, given that the bonds that hold the alliance together are still stronger than the forces pulling it apart.
While Chiozza finds that anti-Americanism[4] in Europe definitely grew in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq,[5] providing evidence that this could be what sparked the crisis, he does not find that this anti-Americanism can be explained through the popular “Bush hypothesis”[6] – he finds that anti-Americanism was due to “growing suspici[ons] that those disagreements reflected something endemic in US society,”[7] hinting that the crisis is more deeply rooted and not simply due to the disagreements surrounding the invasion of Iraq.
Taking the current crisis in transatlantic relations as a given while acknowledging that it has led both to anti-Americanism in Europe and increased levels of euro-skepticism in the U.S., NATO, as one of the key components of the Atlantic Alliance, is still very much a part of the Alliance’s future, and therefore both NATO and the U.S. should encourage the strengthening of European defense integration via ESDP. I will begin by discussing the current transatlantic crisis and what various commentators have to say about it, followed by a discussion on why NATO and the U.S. not only need the E.U., but would benefit from further European integration in the realm of ESDP; I will then discuss why ESDP is not a threat to either NATO or U.S. interests before offering some concluding remarks.
The Atlantic Crisis
Crisis has a negative connotation; however, crises provide opportunities as well as challenges. In this light, the current Atlantic crisis “can lead to resolutions that reestablish the old rules and institutions of a political system, it can lead to a transformation of that political system, or it can lead to a fundamental breakdown and disappearance of the old political system.”[8] As Ikenberry goes on to state, “none of the authors in this volume argues that the West… is going to disappear.”[9] In fact, according to Hitchcock, “many crises within the alliance over the past half century have been resolved by the creation of new rules and institutions that have allowed member states to remain within the community. Thus the Western alliance endures largely through a process of adaptation and flexibility.”[10] In Pierson’s terms,[11] the current crisis can be characterized as the convergence of “Tornado” and “Global Warming” factors.[12] Although more factors than are included in Table A surely play a role in the current crisis (issues of sovereignty, differences in the belief of the importance of institutions, differences in the perception of the importance of international law, differences in the belief on how globalized terror networks should be dealt with, etc…), space simply does not permit a more complete discussion on their role within the crisis.
In his concluding chapter to The End of the West?, Thomas Risse points out that “most authors agree (but see the chapter by Michael Boyers) that the transatlantic relationship is in a serious crisis…however, most contributors equally agree that it is far too soon to spell the end of the West.”[13] At the same time, anti-Americanism in Europe and euro-skepticism in the United States have both been on the rise, with popular media on both sides of the Atlantic quick to point out how different and exceptional they are from the other – an idea labeled “literary politics” or jingoism by Tod Lindberg.[14] A perfect example of such “literary politics” would be the writings of Robert Kagan. Kagan states that “Europe, because of its unique historical experience of the past half-century… has developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power different from the ideals and principles of Americans…”[15] While many European states did not support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, several European countries did, most notably the U.K. – one of the “Big 3” of the E.U. One cannot simply divide the two camps geographically – Kagan’s claims are far too broad, general and fall apart under a closer examination of the facts.
To sum up the brief discussion surrounding the Atlantic crisis, while anti-Americanism and euro-skepticism have been growing on both sides of the Atlantic since March of 2003, best characterized by the rise of “literary politics by commentators on both sides of the Atlantic, and given that the main causal factor, at least of anti-Americanism in Europe, has been a perceived shift in the values of the “other”, very few, if any, commentators are willing to state that the “West” has reached its end in terms of a group of nations that engage in power politics á la the 19th century. What is agreed upon, however, is that the current crisis over Iraq is both real and possibly the worst since NATO was founded. Furthermore, the relevant question now seems to be over what will come out the crisis – reform (and if so, in what way?) or breakdown and dissolution of NATO, leading to increased unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S., E.U. and NATO
When discussing NATO and its connection to transatlantic relations, I will focus on why the U.S. needs the E.U. and why NATO should strengthen its cooperation with the E.U. itself. In his chapter, Ronald Asmus states that there are four reasons that the U.S. needs the E.U.,
“The first is simply to sustain peace and stability in Europe… The second reason is the profound stake that Washington has in the EU remaining a magnet with influence beyond its borders, helping to anchor to the West the young and still fragile democracies on the continent’s periphery… the need for strategic cooperation… to meet the new challenges of the twenty-first century… Last but not least, the United States and the EU have the potential to form a natural coalition of democracies that work together to confront new challenges around the globe.”[16]
The periphery of Europe is full of problems, ranging from Kosovo to Ukraine to Moldova and to Georgia. The U.S. and E.U. need to work together to deal with the myriad of problems in the region and with the 800-pound gorilla in the region – Russia. The biggest threat to Western security is now decentralized global terrorism. It should be remembered that both 9/11 and the London bombings in 2005 were carried out from terrorists in the country – not outside national territory like the U.S.S. Cole incident. As both Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, military strength is not enough to end the threat of terrorism – economic, political and legal development are the long-terms solutions to the problem of terrorism. The capabilities of the U.S. and the E.U. should therefore be seen as complementary and close cooperation is the solution, not competition.
If the current instability in Afghanistan (and in Iraq prior to the “surge” in 2007) has taught the U.S. anything, it is that the U.S. needs its NATO allies more than it would like to admit, especially in the area of civilian capabilities, which is what is needed most in Afghanistan and, coincidentally, what the European members of NATO are best positioned to deliver.[17] These high-need areas correspond with the 1992 Petersberg tasks[18] and with the inclusion of crisis management in ESDP,[19] further illustrating that European members of NATO are committed to build up their capabilities in these ever-more important areas. In this sense Kosovo provides a great example; after NATO took care of the military operations, it was the E.U., not NATO that took control of the ground effort to stabilize Kosovo and provided the civilian capabilities that were needed after the bombing ended. The U.S. and NATO should view the capabilities of the E.U., civilian and crisis management, as complementary to those of the U.S., mostly brute military force.
It should now be clear that the U.S. not only needs the cooperation of the E.U. on various global matters but also specifically in NATO due to their specialization on civilian and crisis management capabilities, where the U.S. is the most lacking. For too long the U.S. has viewed European integration as a threat both to its own unipolarity and to NATO as a whole. In the next section I will argue that European integration, via ESDP, is not a threat to the dominance of the U.S. or to NATO and should no longer be seen as such.
ESDP and NATO
American opposition to further European integration is based on several ideas, however, the main idea is that increased European integration will lead to Europe “balancing” the U.S. The first problem with this idea is its policy implications – active opposition to European integration, such as the Lisbon Treaty. The passage of the Lisbon Treaty should signal one thing to the United States: the European Union is here and is not leaving anytime soon; besides, as Lindberg states[20], the main players in Lisbon Treaty debate are Europeans themselves, and the U.S. has little direct ability to influence the outcome. The second problem, the idea that the E.U. will “balance” the power of the U.S. with further integration and cooperation, is also addressed by Lindberg, “ ‘Balancing’ is – or was – about power… the test for ‘balancing’ behavior on the part of France [or Europe as a whole] would be French action to bulk up its military capabilities in order to enforceably insist the United States take pause. The same would apply to the EU. One cannot ‘balance’ anything on the basis of intention alone; Capability is necessary.”[21] The U.S. cannot simply complain that the E.U. does not do enough to build up its military power and then, at the same time, complain that the E.U. is attempting to “balance” American power by enhancing the ability of its member states to cooperate with one another.
This hints at the second major debate concerning ESDP – is ESDP a threat to NATO? Here, the U.S. has two major concerns, first, that ESDP will represent a shifting of European energy away from NATO and therefore “will make more difficult the ‘handing over’ of military combat responsibilities to NATO if and when the level of crisis or military action escalates to the point of requiring the intervention of the more robust U.S.-backed alliance… and second, that the EU countries will decide upon positions among themselves and then present them as a unified bloc when debate takes place within the North Atlantic Council.[22] Concerning the first argument, it should be noted that ESDP, unlike NATO, is not defensive in nature, “it excludes any form of territorial defense; it is provided with civil and military capabilities by the member states in order to execute missions of crisis and conflict management”.[23] While the second argument actually holds water, Hunter makes a great point here – if E.U. ambassadors actually started taking such rigid positions and deprived NATO of its ability to craft compromises, this would insinuate that “…NATO would surely have a lot more important things to worry about concerning the state of transatlantic relations.”[24] It is important to note that ESDP, via the Berlin-Plus agreement, does not threaten NATO assets either, does not concern itself with NATOs historically main objective, that of territorial protection, nor is it somehow a “balancing force” meant to counter American military hegemony, despite Gaullist rhetoric stating that Europe should “counter” American hegemony.
Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to broadly survey what commentators on both sides of the Atlantic are saying while at the same time briefly discuss the scope of the crisis and what possible outcomes it may have. While I acknowledge that the current Atlantic crisis is indeed a major issue, I agree with most scholars in the The End of the West? in that the crisis presents an opportunity for NATO to adapt its institutions – which has been the secret to its longevity - and to work closer with the E.U. Neither the U.S. nor NATO have reason to fear further European integration and tighter military cooperation via ESDP, and if even if they did, given the recent passage of the Lisbon Treaty, there is little that the U.S. and NATO can do about it. While NATO and ESDP surely have areas of overlap, the Berlin-Plus agreement should reassure NATO that it won’t suffer materially due to ESDP. While the U.S. needs the E.U. and all that European NATO members can bring to the table, so NATO also needs ESDP and its focus on civilian capabilities, which are proving to be just as important in twenty-first century warfare as traditional military capabilities were in the early twentieth century. Lastly, American fears that Europe is somehow trying to “balance” American military power in the world are unfounded and go against decades of American foreign policy – these positions should not be thrown to the wayside so easily. While the U.S. does have a point in stating that ESDP could lead to a situation where European NATO members come to an agreement outside of NATO procedures and then refuse to budge, weakening NATO, if this were to happen, as mentioned earlier, this would signify that there are much larger problems in the Atlantic alliance and are very unlikely in any case.
Table A
Selection of Short and Long-Term Causes in the Current Atlantic Crisis
|
“Tornados” |
“Global Warming” |
|
American refusal to use NATO after 9/11 |
End of the Cold War – loss of NATOs traditional enemy |
|
American “unilateralism” in Iraq |
Expansion of NATO leads to a decrease in overall cohesion within the Alliance |
|
|
Perceived threat of ESDP to NATO |
*While American “unilateralism” in Iraq could have the potential to be an “Earthquake”, it is still too early to tell, and therefore it is placed as a “Tornado”
Bibliography
Anderson, Jeffrey, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse, eds. The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order. Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 2008. Print.
Cameron, Fraser, ed. An Introduction to European Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007. Print.
Cameron, Fraser, ed. The Future of E.U.rope: Integration and Enlargement. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005. Print.
Chiozza, Giacomo. “A Crisis Like No Other? Anti-Americanism at the Time of the Iraq War.” European Journal of International Relations 15.2 (2009): 257-89. Print.
Dutu, Petre, and Irina Poleanschi. “ESDP and he EU Member Sttes’ Security and Defence Policy.” Strategic Impact 3 (2007): 25-30. Central and Eastern European Online Library. Web. <www.ceeol.com>.
Gordon, Philip H., and Jeremy Shapiro. Allies at War: America, E.U.rope, and the Crisis Over Iraq. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2004. Print.
Kagan, Robert. “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, No. 113 (June and July 2002).
Serfaty, Simon, ed. Visions of the Atlantic Alliance: The United States, the European Union, and NATO. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005. Print.
[1] See Hitchcock’s chapter, entitled “The Ghost of Crises Past: The Troubled Alliance in Historical Perspective” in The End of the West: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order for a comparison of the current crisis over Iraq with historical examples since NATOs inception in the early years of the Cold War
[2] Ibid, p. 53 - Quotation is from Hitchcock‘s characterization of Kupchan’s position in a later chapter in the same book.
[3]Ibid, this is Hitchcock‘s opinion
[4] It is important to note that Chiozza differentiates between European opinions of U.S. – Americans and the United States as a country. Thus, anti-Americanism would be negative opinions of U.S. – Americans, not necessarily the country
[5] Chiozza, Giacomo. “A Crisis Like No Other? Anti-Americanism at the Time of the Iraq War.” European Journal of International Relations 15.2 (2009): 257-89. Print. See Figure 2 – Opinion of the US and the American People, 2002 – 05, page 260
[6] Chiozza characterizes the “Bush Hypothesis” in the following manner – “A popular explanation for the current status of the image of the United States claims that the blame should be placed on the shoulders of President George W. Bush. His style, his political stances, his religiosity are considered an insufferable oddity in many quarters and an irksome reminder of how the United States is different and proud to be so.” (p. 267)
[7] Ibid, p. 283
[8] Ikenberry, p. 3, in Anderson, Ikenberry, and Risse, eds
[9] Ibid, p. 5
[10] Ibid, p. 15 – Ikenberry is summarizing Hitchcock’s views presented in chapter 3 of the same volume
[11] See Pierson, Paul. “Big, Slow-Moving and…. Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 177 – 207 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
[12] This information is presented in Hellman’s contribution to The End of the West and is found on page 33 – “Tornados” are characterized as factors with short-term causes with short-term outcomes, whereas “Global Warming” factors are characterized as long-term causes with long-term outcomes. These are in opposition to “Meteorite hits” which have short-term causes with long-term outcomes and “Earthquakes”, which have long-term causes and short-term outcomes. Please see annex A for a table which differentiates between “tornado” factors and “global warming” factors in the current alliance crisis.
[13] Risse, p. 264, in Anderson, Ikenberry and Risse, eds.
[14] Lindberg, p. 13 – 15, in Serfaty, ed. For a more in-depth discussion on anti-Americanism in E.U.rope in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, please see Chiozza’s piece
[15] Kagan, p. 3 when printed
[16] Asmus, p. 25 – 27, in Serfaty, ed.
[17] By „civilian capabilities“ I mean political, military and police advisors/trainers, civilian reconstruction experts
[18] Here I am referring to combat missions for crisis management
[19] Dutu and Poleanschi, p. 27 – 28; the sectors included: police, law enforcement, civil administration and civil protection, all of which are greatly deficient in Afghanistan today and will probably make up a major part of the 30,000 troops which President Obama will reinforce Afghanistan with in the upcoming months.
[20] See Lindberg’s chapter in Serfaty, ed.
[21] Ibid, p. 11
[22] Robert E. Hunter, p. 58 in Serfaty, ed.
[23] Dutu and Poleanschi, p. 30
[24] Hunter, p. 59 in Serfaty, ed.
