BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//hertie-school.org//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.29.29// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH UID:f06cc33e-185d-4cb0-bc12-f4d6d6f87f53 X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Berlin X-WR-CALDESC:Oligopolistic price leadership and mergers: The United States beer industry X-WR-RELCALID:eca89405-bb65-4494-94dd-6fd257fa562b BEGIN:VEVENT UID:18c81b52-3a1a-4367-92e5-0246beba85d9 DTSTAMP:20201026T062316Z DESCRIPTION:Join us for a presentation by Nathan Miller of Georgetown Unive rsity. \nAbout the speaker:Nathan Miller is the Saleh Romeih Associate Pro fessor at the Georgetown University McDonough School of Business. His rese arch covers topics in the fields of industrial organization and antitrust economics\, with a recent focus on collusion and the competitive effects o f mergers. He has published articles in the American Economic Review\, Eco nometrica\, and the RAND Journal of Economics\, among other journals. Prio r to joining Georgetown University\, Professor Miller served as an economi st at the U.S. Department of Justice\, where he provided economic analysis for antitrust investigations\, including the merger review of AT&T and T- Mobile. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California\, Berkeley and a B.A. from the University of Virginia. \nAbstract:We study an infinitely-repeated game of oligopolistic price leadership in which one firm\, the leader\, proposes a supermarkup over Bertrand prices to a coal ition of rivals. We estimate the model with aggregate scanner data on the beer industry and find the supermarkup accounts for 6% of price. Price lea dership increases profit by 8.9% relative to Bertrand competition\, and de creases consumer surplus by nearly four times the change in profit. We use the model to simulate the ABI/Modelo merger. The merger relaxes incentive compatibility constraints and increases the equilibrium supermarkup. Merg er efficiencies do not mitigate – and can amplify –this coordinated effect . The BAMS is a research seminar which is jointly organized by the DIW\, Hertie School\, Humboldt University\, Free University\, TU Berlin and WZB and co-funded by the Berlin Centre for Consumer Policies (BCCP) and Collab orative Research Center 'Transregio' (SFB/TR 190). For further informati on on BAMS\, please visit https://sites.google.com/site/berlinappliedmicro seminar/. \nPrior registration is not necessary. DTSTART:20191216T150000Z LOCATION:Hertie School | 2.61 SUMMARY:Oligopolistic price leadership and mergers: The United States beer industry END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:18c81b52-3a1a-4367-92e5-0246beba85d9 DTSTAMP:20201026T062316Z DESCRIPTION:Join us for a presentation by Nathan Miller of Georgetown Unive rsity. \nAbout the speaker:Nathan Miller is the Saleh Romeih Associate Pro fessor at the Georgetown University McDonough School of Business. His rese arch covers topics in the fields of industrial organization and antitrust economics\, with a recent focus on collusion and the competitive effects o f mergers. He has published articles in the American Economic Review\, Eco nometrica\, and the RAND Journal of Economics\, among other journals. Prio r to joining Georgetown University\, Professor Miller served as an economi st at the U.S. Department of Justice\, where he provided economic analysis for antitrust investigations\, including the merger review of AT&T and T- Mobile. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California\, Berkeley and a B.A. from the University of Virginia. \nAbstract:We study an infinitely-repeated game of oligopolistic price leadership in which one firm\, the leader\, proposes a supermarkup over Bertrand prices to a coal ition of rivals. We estimate the model with aggregate scanner data on the beer industry and find the supermarkup accounts for 6% of price. Price lea dership increases profit by 8.9% relative to Bertrand competition\, and de creases consumer surplus by nearly four times the change in profit. We use the model to simulate the ABI/Modelo merger. The merger relaxes incentive compatibility constraints and increases the equilibrium supermarkup. Merg er efficiencies do not mitigate – and can amplify –this coordinated effect . The BAMS is a research seminar which is jointly organized by the DIW\, Hertie School\, Humboldt University\, Free University\, TU Berlin and WZB and co-funded by the Berlin Centre for Consumer Policies (BCCP) and Collab orative Research Center 'Transregio' (SFB/TR 190). For further informati on on BAMS\, please visit https://sites.google.com/site/berlinappliedmicro seminar/. \nPrior registration is not necessary. DTSTART:20191216T150000Z LOCATION:Hertie School | 2.61 SUMMARY:Oligopolistic price leadership and mergers: The United States beer industry END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR