How can Germany deliver its promised security Zeitenwende?

February 2022 was a turning point for German security policy – a Zeitenwende, as Chancellor Olaf Scholz called it. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine meant that Europe was no longer as safe as many had thought, and that Germany would have to take on a more active role on security. 2025 could be a similar watershed: with the re-election of Donald Trump to the US presidency, Germany and its allies in Europe can no longer take US security guarantees for granted. 

What progress has Germany made in updating its security policy since 2022? What challenges remain for Germany’s next government, to be elected later this month? As policymakers and researchers gather for this year’s Munich Security Conference, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for International Security Marina Henke shares her thoughts on how Germany can make its security policy fit for a new age of insecurity.
 

This year marks the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. How far has Germany come in revising its security and defence strategy?

Frankly, not far enough. True, in the wake of the invasion, the German Bundestag approved a special fund of 100 billion euros for military armament, and the traffic light coalition set the target of an annual military budget of (at least) two per cent of Germany’s gross domestic product. But successful security policy is not just about the redistribution of funds, it’s also about strategy. This is where Germany still struggles. What kind of world do we want to live in tomorrow? What are the most important goals we want to achieve? What are the biggest threats preventing us from achieving these goals? While the German government did adopt a “National Security Strategy” in 2023 – the first in German history – these crucial questions remain unanswered.

Why does Germany so urgently need to think strategically?

Right now, Germany comes across as a country that’s being driven by other countries’ strategies while failing to develop one itself. Germany lacks a realistic vision of how it wants to provide for its national security and prosperity. So it’s no wonder people here ask why certain measures are necessary. Strategy development forces decision-makers to take a stand and create a vision of the future – and it increases the likelihood of this vision becoming reality. 

The formulation of a clear strategy also means that funds are used more efficiently. If a state does not know exactly what goals it wants to pursue and what it needs to do to achieve them, it runs the risk of spending money in the wrong areas – and Germany can’t afford that. Strategy provides a foreign policy direction and clearly states where money, troops, surveillance capacities, time and other resources should be spent.

President Donald Trump has demanded that NATO member states contribute at least five per cent of their gross national product to the alliance. On the other hand, many in Germany would like to see a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. What should Germany be doing now?

If Germany wants to continue benefitting from the US security umbrella, it must prove to the Trump Administration that it is still valuable to the USA, that it’s worth defending. To do this, Germany not only has to increase its defence budget; it also needs to adopt a clear foreign policy position that unequivocally supports the United States – for example, in its conflict with China. This harbours costs and risks, but it could pay off in terms of security policy and economics. After all, establishing a purely European defence policy would entail even higher costs in the long term, would take a long time, and is not politically feasible at present. 

At the same time, Germany must rebuild the intellectual infrastructure that will allow it to think strategically. During the Cold War, Germany provided intellectual leadership in NATO. This hasn’t been the case since the 1990s. What’s more, very few German universities, think tanks and government research institutions today practise research and teaching on strategic issues – the Hertie School is one of the big exceptions! If it’s to succeed, the Zeitenwende must be a dual-track process: (1) restoring Germany’s military defence capability and (2) rebuilding the intellectual infrastructure that allows Germany to think strategically and foster a broad understanding of security policy among its population. The latter will be indispensable for the societal acceptance of Germany’s security and defence reform programme.

Marina Henke is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for International Security at the Hertie School. She focusses on the topics of grand strategy, nuclear security, and European security and defence policy.

The Hertie School is not responsible for any content linked or referred to from these pages. Views expressed by the author/interviewee may not necessarily reflect the views and values of the Hertie School.