

The Governance Report

Transnational Governance Dashboard Codebook

actual.minus.target - Emissions reduction minus Kyoto target reduction Emissions reduction minus Kyoto target reduction (range 0-100, percent of baseline year emissions). Source: <http://unfccc.int>

dumping.defendant - Number of antidumping measures enacted against country $\log(1+x)$, where x is the number of anti-dumping measures enacted against country. Source: Bown 2012. <http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/>.

AD.measures - Number of antidumping measures the country enacted $\log(1+x)$, where x is the number of anti-dumping measures the country enacted. Source: Bown 2012. <http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/>.

GDP.share.contri - Financial contribution to peacekeeping budget Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping budget as a share of country GDP (range 0-100, percent). Sources: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>.

score.troops - Troops contribution Log troops contribution, adjusted by population. The adjustment is performed by regressing log troops on log population. The information for contingent size (for the years 2005-2011) comes from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>.

IMF.VP.SM: IMF Voting Power Index, Simple Majority Voting Power Index in the IMF Executive Board: number of winning coalitions in which a country is critical, over total number of minimal winning coalitions. Based on Enderlein and Ruiz (2012). IMF Quotas available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm>.

IMF.VP.70: IMF Voting Power Index, 70% Supermajority Voting Power Index in the IMF Executive Board: number of winning coalitions in which a country is critical, over total number of minimal winning coalitions. Based on Enderlein and Ruiz (2012). IMF Quotas available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm>.

IMF.VP.85: IMF Voting Power Index, 85% Supermajority Voting Power Index in the IMF Executive Board: number of winning coalitions in which a country is critical, over total number of minimal winning coalitions. Based on Enderlein and Ruiz (2012). IMF Quotas available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm>.

Dim 1: Palestine question Ideal point estimate (posterior mean) on latent dimension dealing with the Middle East conflict. The voting matrix (covering votes that took place between December 2005 and December 2011) is built based on information in <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379> up to 2009 and <http://unbisnet.un.org> for recent years.

Palestine.se Posterior standard deviation of the ideal point on dimension 1.

Palestinebtm and **Palestinetop** Bounds of the 95% credible interval for the ideal point on dimension 1.

Dim 2: Conventional weapons control Ideal point estimate (posterior mean) on latent dimension dealing with conventional weapons control. The voting matrix (covering votes that took place between December 2005 and December 2011) is built based on information in <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379> up to 2009 and <http://unbisnet.un.org> for recent years.

Conv.Weapons.se Posterior standard deviation of the ideal point on dimension 2.

Conv.Weaponsbtm and **Conv.Weaponstop** Bounds of the 95% credible interval for the ideal point on dimension 2.

Dim 3: Nuclear weapons control. Ideal point estimate (posterior mean) on latent dimension dealing with nuclear weapons control. The voting matrix (covering votes that took place between December 2005 and December 2011) is built based on information in <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379> up to 2009 and <http://unbisnet.un.org> for recent years.

Nuclear.se Posterior standard deviation of the ideal point on dimension 3.

Nuclearbtm and **Nucleartop** Bounds of the 95% credible interval for the ideal point on dimension 3.

Dim 4: International economic fairness Ideal point estimate (posterior mean) on latent dimension dealing with economic fairness. The voting matrix (covering votes that took place between December 2005 and December 2011) is built based on information in <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379> up to 2009 and <http://unbisnet.un.org> for recent years.

Equity.se Posterior standard deviation of the ideal point on dimension 4.

Equitybtm and **Equitytop** Bounds of the 95% credible interval for the ideal point on dimension 4.

Legal matters - Ideal point estimate, propensity to ratify treaties that deal with legal matters. Ideal point estimate (posterior mean), propensity to ratify treaties that deal with legal matters. The ratification matrix is built based on the information available at <http://treaties.un.org> for treaties that had at least one ratification between 1998 and 2011.

Legal matter SD Posterior standard deviation of the ideal point on the legal matters dimension.

Natural resources - Ideal point estimate, propensity to ratify treaties that deal with natural resource management. Ideal point estimate (posterior mean), propensity to ratify treaties that deal with natural

resource management. The ratification matrix is built based on the information available at <http://treaties.un.org> for treaties that had at least one ratification between 1998 and 2011.

Natural resources SD Posterior standard deviation of the ideal point on the natural resources dimension.

References

Bown, Chad P. 2012. *Global Antidumping Database*. Retrieved from <http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/>

Enderlein, Henrik, and Christian Ruiz. 2012. “Musical Chairs: Voting Power and the External Representation of the Euro in the IMF, G8, and G20.” Paper presented at the European Union in International Affairs III Conference, Brussels, Belgium.